A close friend of mine, who happens to be a neuroscientist-well acquainted with all the vicissitudes of our brains-recently told me: 'You know, I always thought you had a highly theoretical and abstract mind, but I now realize that you are really a meat and potato kind of guy!' Though I was initially hurt by his rather blunt and unsolicited observation, as I thought about it more I began to realize that there was perhaps some truth to what he was saying and that being a 'meat and potato guy' is not so bad after all! I begin by recounting this conversation both to apologize if what I have to say in this article sounds a bit too commonsensical, and to contextualize my seemingly anachronistic return to such 'old-fashioned' concepts as nation and immigration in what appears to be a globalized world populated by 'nomadic subjects'.
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Even a cursory glance at the recent works of cultural critics and postcolonial theorists will suffice to confirm that keywords such as nation and immigration are no longer in vogue today, as new concepts such as postnation and diaspora have displaced them in our current intellectual parlance. Encouraged by seemingly radical changes heralded by economic globalization, transnational migration across the globe, and the spread of electronic culture, most cultural and postcolonial theorists have suggested that overmastering and monologic notions of identity and culture associated with a particular nation or ethnicity impair intellectual freedom, suppress creative interaction between members of various communities, and ultimately fail to describe the nuanced and complicated hybrid formations that characterize our global relations today. These critics therefore view the nation form as an obsolete model of community, cultivated only by (Appadurai 1993) . He uses these terms to elaborate three related implications of globalization as a general phenomenon, transforming cultural, economic, and political relations everywhere in the world. First, he employs these terms to mean 'the [historical] process of moving to a global order in which the nation-state has become obsolete and other formations for allegiance and identity have taken its place'. Second, he has in mind the 'alternative forms for the organization of global traffic in resources, images, and ideas-forms that either contest the nation-state actively or constitute peaceful alternatives for large-scale political loyalties'. And third, the notion of postnation implies what may be labeled diasporic nationalism, which, encouraged by 'the steady erosion of the capabilities of the nation-state to monopolize loyalty,' are 'largely divorced from territorial states' (169). The example that Appadurai cites to drive these points home is, interestingly, the United States, an enormously wealthy superpower that has been able to organize itself around 'a modern political ideology in which pluralism is central to the conduct of democratic life'-a nation where various immigrant communities have been able to manufacture what he calls 'delocalized transnations' that retain special ideological links to a putative place of origin but are otherwise thoroughly diasporic collectivities (173). Insightful though Appadurai's argument is in locating the cultural implications of globalization, his salutary claims about the disappearance of nation-state and the emergence of diaspora communities appear problematic, especially since 9/11, a tragic event that not only ushered a powerful form of patriotism in the United States, but also helped fortify the power of state apparatuses such as FBI, CIA, and the INS, linked and centrally organized now under the rubric of the new Department of Homeland Security. I have discussed the impact of 9/11 elsewhere (Behdad forthcoming), but let me restate here parenthetically a crucial point about the specific context of the United States before I proceed with my discussion of Appadurai's argument. What is remarkable about the hurried passage of the USA Patriotic Act that essentially curtailed certain constitutional rights of citizens after 9/11 was the powerful way in which the figure of the immigrant/foreigner once again provided the differential other through whose threatening presence in the nation a state of emergency was declared, enabling thus the entrenchment of disciplinary apparatuses and surveillance procedures as necessary security measures to protect the democratic polity from the other's terror-apparatuses and surveillance procedures that had already been tested and used at the U.S.-Mexico border long before the tragic events of 9/11 gave the government the perfect rationale to extent them to every port of entry. Not only was a substantial part of the Patriot Act devoted to the enhancement of regulatory immigration procedures that denied foreigners, immigrants, and permanent residents habeas corpus and due judicial review and permitted indefinite detention of those in violation of any immigration status, including such a minor offense as overstaying a visa, but the bill also implicitly depicted the brown-skinned immigrant-Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and Latino, among others-as a threat to the democratic nation in an apocalyptic fashion that called for an Whether we read Said, Bhabha or Appadurai, we notice the paired critique of nationalism and celebration of a more cosmopolitan, imagined community-for Said, it is the calling for a Palestinian nation that haunts his celebration of exile as a metaphor of ideal subjectivity; for Bhabha, it is the 'scattering of the people that in other times and other places, in the nations of others, becomes a time of gathering' (Bhabha 1990a, 291) ; and for Appadurai it is the delocalized transnation that is celebrated against the white nation.
What are we to make of these contradictory articulations of the nation form? How are we to go beyond the problematic binary of good nationalism vs. bad nationalism implied in this critical debate?
A starting point to address these questions is to unpack the relation between state and nation and explore their roles in the global flow of people, capital, and commodities that (Behdad 1998) . Similarly, the integration of Europe in the form of a union has also meant tougher restrictions on the movement of people from the Middle East, Africa, and most of Asia to Europe.
Moreover, in spite of the increase in global cultural contacts, nationalist sentiments persist throughout the world and states continue to exert a great deal of power as to how a national community is globalized. On the one hand, as R. Radhakrishnan points out:
neither the deracinating multi-or inter-national spread of capitalism nor the Marxist theoretical assimilation of the national question within an internationalist communism has been able to do away with the urgencies of the imagined communities of nationalism (Radhakrishnan 1992, 83 'political community continue to be shaped by the territorial reach of state sovereignty' (Held et al 1999, 85-86) Elements for a Theorization' cogently suggests that globalization 'persists as a partial condition' by which she means that there is significant overlap and interaction between the global and the national (Sassen 2000, 215) . She writes, 'Each sphere, global and national, describes a spatio-temporal order with considerable internal differentiation and growing mutual imbrications with the other' (216). One direction, she seems to suggest, is not to forget the nation in our postnational consciousness, but to study instead the 'dynamics of interaction between the global and the national', a dynamic that sheds light on the 'incipient and partial denationalization of domains once understood and/or constructed as national ' (216) . What the more nuanced discussions of globalization such as Sassen's make evident is that the uneven flow between nationalism and globalization is fundamentally context-dependent, and that while transnational circuits are appearing throughout the world, their formations are always socio-historically contingent and culturally specific. Indeed, the strategic nature of economic globalization, as Sassen cogently argues, suggests that 'most global processes materialize in national territories nations, a fact that is sociologically evident in the rise of ethnic enclaves throughout the city and their nostalgic re-invention of certain arcane traditions. In many cases, the sense of loss and disenfranchisement among many immigrant communities has led to a new form of tribalism characterized by antagonism and racial superiority toward other minorities. As James Clifford points out, 'Indeed, some of the most violent articulations of purity and racial exclusivism come from diaspora populations' (Clifford 1997, 251) . In short, it is not clear that 'delocalized transnations' are free from the chauvinism of nationalism or the forces of state apparatuses, as Appadurai seems to suggest, nor is it evident that they necessarily constitute oppositional alternatives to the hegemonic power of the majority by displacing 'the great metropolitan narratives of progress, law, and order', as Bhabha claims (Appadurai 1996, 169; Bhabha 1990b, 218) .
In addition, it is important to note that, as Edouard Glissant has cogently argued, 'The permutations of cultural contact change more quickly than any one theory could account for. No theory of cultural contact is [thus] conducive to generalization' (Glissant 1989, 19) . Hence the importance of the local and the impossibility of a generalizing notion of Portal Vol. 2, No. 2 July 2005postcolonial or postnational subjectivity, for transnational forms are always interpolated by the politics of location, and as such their manifestations can be quite varied, and always over-determined. There are, for example, obvious differences between the experiences of various immigrant communities in the United States-for instance, while some communities, such as Armenians in Glendale, California, have been able to maintain a sense of collectivity and cultural particularity across their national backgrounds, Caribbean immigrants in New York City have fashioned a creolized identity with blacks and Latinos, an identity that is less ethnically rigid and more culturally fluid. In addition, there are also radical permutations even within a single immigrant community, permutations that, again, are over-determined by class, gender, religion, and language. Such differences within and across immigrant communities demand an understanding of interculturality that is attentive to the specificity of their historical formations and geographical locations.
My aim in raising the issue of diasporic exclusivism and its local interpolation is not to pose a binary relation between the symbolic and the real. Nor is it my aim to claim nationalist sentiment as an antidote to global disempowerment. Rather, my hope is to draw attention to the discrepancy between celebratory explorations of diasporic consciousness by academics, writers, and artists and the complex and over-determined itineraries of many immigrants caught in the tailspin of a globalization that has made them immigrate to the West in hopes of upward economic mobility and political freedom.
This discrepancy is symptomatic of the difference between what the political theorist John Armstrong calls 'mobilized and proletarian diasporas' (Armstrong 1976 ).
Armstrong acknowledges the vagueness of the term 'diaspora' to describe 'any ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base within a given polity'. But he attempts to make this term more useful by introducing what I consider to be a very helpful, albeit insufficient, distinction between the proletarian class of diasporas who are 'a disadvantaged product of modernized polities' (for example, Mexican farm and service workers in Southern California) and the mobilized class, defined as 'an ethnic group which does not have a general status advantage, yet which enjoys many material and cultural advantages compared to other groups in the multiethnic polity' (for example, Iranians in Southern California or Indians in Northern California) (393). Armstrong raises not only the issue of social class or even symbolic capital here, but he also discusses a broad range of other factors such as religion, language, labor, cultural myth, networks of family and personal relationships to schematize the critical differences that exist between various communities of immigrants. Obviously, no diasporic community fits neatly into these categories, because immigrants occupy a plurality of social and economic positions, but this sort of distinction is critically necessary, because it calls into question the unmoored metaphors of border-crossing, nomadism, and hybridity so prevalent among postcolonial intellectuals and cultural critics. The kind of distinction Armstrong introduces is useful in helping us differentiate various trajectories of displacement and become attentive to the historical taintedness of tropes of mobility that are so fashionable in intellectual circles today.
Moreover, Armstrong's distinction between mobilized and proletariat diasporas is helpful in understanding why émigré writers and intellectuals from the ex-European colonies as The popular rhetoric of postnationalism and diaspora suggest that the world is becoming a better place to live through an intensification of economic interdependence, technological interconnectedness, and cultural hybridization. The demise of state power, according to the boosters of globalization, has led to a positive diffusion of authority, while technological advances have enabled a more mobile and pluralistic sense of cultural and political identity. These would obviously be salutary developments were it not for the fact that they are available only to a tiny and privileged minority. As Pico Iyer insightfully observes: one of the most troubling features of the globalization we celebrate is that the so-called linking of the planet has, in fact, intensified the distance between people: the richest 358 people in the world, by UN calculations, have a financial worth as great as that of 2.3 billion others, and even in the United States, the prosperous home of egalitarianism, the most wired man in the land (Bill Gates) has a net worth larger than that of 40 percent of the country's households, or perhaps 100 million of his compatriots combined (Iyer 2000, 25-26) .
If I espouse the skeptical position in these postcolonial debates it is not to undermine the advantages of cultural, economic and political interconnectedness, but to draw attention to how the boosters of transnationalism and diaspora have failed to address the contingent and uneven nature of global flow. What seem urgent now are not more paeans to the global ideal, but a willingness to confront the challenges that stand in the way of its realization. Counter-intuitively perhaps, a global future demands a present engagement with the enduring issue of unequal and uneven development.
To conclude, what I have been obliquely attempting here has been to suggest that a critical form of postcolonial discourse can offer a historical corrective to the celebratory theories of diaspora and postnationalism. I think cultural theories of transnationalism and Economists have singled out two historical periods, 1870-1939 and 1950-1973, as central to the rise of global order: while in the first period 'markets for key goods began to acquire a global dimension', during the second period, labeled the 'golden age', 'trade volumes grew at 5.8 per cent per annum, … [and] world output grew at an unprecedented rate of 3.9 per cent per annum' (Held et al 1999, 163-164) . What has been overlooked by economists, however, is the role of European colonialism and de-colonization in the rise of global order, neither acknowledging nor exploring the fact that these periods coincided with the height of European colonialism and its dismantling, respectively. Postcolonial discourse, I think, is well positioned to map the colonial contexts of global flows to discern the unequal geography of our global condition. In particular, postcolonial historiography can provide a critical genealogy to explicate the political shift from European colonialism to American imperialism. What are the conditions, we may ask for example, that enabled the global spread of imperialism after the spectacular phenomenon of de-colonization? What cultural attitudes, political practices, and economic strategies from the colonial period continue to persist today? Why have ex-colonized nations failed to reap the benefits of global trade? There are certainly no easy answers to these questions, but to grapple with the issues they raise may provide a springboard, if not a framework, towards a postcolonial genealogy of globalization.
